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I. Introduction

The Case
Management Order:
Use and Efficacy in
Complex Litigation and
the Toxic Tort
By Scott A. Stener&

Case management orders are designed to
serve a variety of pragmaticobjectives. These
include not only expediting and focusing the
litigation, but also as the current version of
the rule recognimzes, facilitatingsettlement. We
think it follows that case management isan
court has 'considerable
area in which the
discretion."
As particular areas of litigation engender
greater complexity, trial courts face the unenviable task of reconciling efficiency with fairness. Until recently, many would have thought
these two goals compatible. But as time-consuming and costly litigation has become more
prevalent, one may be left inquiring: Must the
twin commandments with which the judiciary
is charged be mutually exclusive? Without
active case management, mutual exclusivity
may indeed result. Still, one might think that a
capable judge would have little trouble balancing efficiency with fairness in most cases.
Such a conclusion would likely have been
correct, until recently, when administrative
agencies and the extensive power they wield
began to assert a significant role in litigation
Rules and orders promulgated by administrative agencies often enable lawsuits where no
suit was possible before.' For example, the
government's increased role in cataloging and
monitoring industry could result in a concomitant increase in the number of litigated
environmental or toxic tort cases.! In addition,
the adjudicative role often played by agencies
& I.., University of California, Hastings College of the
Law. 1999. BA. University of California. lIvine, 1996. The author
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i. United States v. Charles George Trucking. 34 E3d 1081.
1090 (Ist Cir 1993) (citing FED. R.cOv R 16 and quoting Germania
v. First NatI Bank, 653 F2d 1.5 (ist Cir 1981Jj.
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See Dixie L Laswell & JenniferT Nilman. Use t'CMOs

Cases, 24 N'L Ll..
-- Counsd Setk to Simrpify Complr T0",cs
September 7. 1992. col. 3.
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Set it The obvious Implication from this statement is

that the closer government looks, the more it finds. Since
increased government scrutiny reveals much more than might
otheiwise be known, an Increased likelihood of litigation results.
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provides an avenue of redress that previously
may have been too difficult to attain.
As a result, judges are now faced with the
difficult challenge of assuring fairness and
rational expedience in their courtrooms. Their
ability to do so has increased in recent years.'
Throughout the 1980s, the power of the court
to manage cases was widely acknowledged. In
addition, changes adopted by the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure began to define just
how much power the judge was afforded in
controlling litigation and the preliminary
stages leading to it. The efficacy of rules such
as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Sixteen
became particularly recognized when complex
litigation threatened to spiral out of control
Still, abstract Rules of Civil Procedure,
accepted court powers, and a general legislative trend authorizing courts to control the
pace and speed of litigation only begin to hint
at a more recent innovation: the case management order ("CMO").8 CMOs, when applied to
complex litigation, "help organize the cases
and counsel, preserve evidence, set priorities
for pretrial pleadings and other activity, defer
unnecessary pleadings, identify preliminarily
the legal and factual issues, outline preliminary discovery and motions, and direct counsel to coordinate the implementation of the
order."9 Thiis general statement only summarizes the basic practical aspects of these procedural tools. The Manual for Complex
Litigation.provides one example of the potential reach of case management orders.'" There,
general notions of judicial economy were used
to justify a detailed, extensive and thorough
5. See Fed. lud. Ctr., MANUAL FORCOMPLEX

LITIGATION at xiii

(3d ed. 1995).
6. See id.
7. FED. R. civ. P. 16 (authorizing the court to order pre-trial
conferences, to enter scheduling orders, and to impose sanctions). Though Rule 16 is not a recent creation, it illustrates the
long-standing belief that pre-trial management and active scheduling by a court help ensure a high quality of justice. The advisory committee notes explain that pre-trial involvement by a court
may improve the quality of lustice rendered
by sharpening
the preparation and presentation of cases, tending to eliminate
trial surpnse, and improving, as well as facilitating, the settlement process." FED. R.Civ. P. 16 advisory committee's notes.
8. "Case management order' or 'CMO" will be used interchangeably in this note.

9. Fed. Jud. Ctr., MANUAL FORCOMPLEX Lh71GATION
§ 33.22 (3d
ed. 1995).
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case management order."
Case management orders are already powerful and often indispensable tools, and
should be made completely available to the
judiciary, whose resources will be Indisputably
taxed to new limits in the coming years. Even
though the important issue of vacancies on the
federal bench, for example, has been initially
addressed by the United States Senate, both
federal and state judges alike face crushing
case loads, increased complex litigation and
greater public attention to the role the courts
2
play.1

Without case management orders, the
quality of justice suffers. The case management order is usually a routine and frequently
welcome guest in courtrooms across America.'3 Yet, the issuance of CMOs still incites
derision among litigants, further clogging the
courts. This Note advocates for the imposition
of case management orders wherever their
presence benefits the legal system. Formal and
unequivocal federal, state and local recognition of the validity of case management orders
must be forthcoming. Chal-lenges to the imposition of CMOs continue to come before appellate courts, wasting judicial time and detrimentally assailing the cogency of-this invaluable procedural tool." Appellate courts are too
often forced to deal with adjudicating CMO
matters, even though such orders are usually
considered pretrial discovery orders." In addition, methods exist by which a plaintiff can
avoid California's "fast track" case management system by "not filing suit until just before
the statute of limitations runs."'The legisla10. Id.
i1. See id, at n.1023 (discussing the application of case
management orders to the Breast Implant Litigation)
12. See Too Many Federal Court Vacancies, N.Y,TiMEs ABsTRAcTs,
Feb. 14. 1997, at AI.

13. See Katherine Smith Dedrick, Case Man Tgement and Oiher
Pre-Tnal Considerations:The lnsurer's Perspective, 691 PLI/CoMM 541,
546 (1994).
14. See, e.g.. Lu v. Super. Ct., 55 Cal. App. 4th 1264 (1997)
(providing one of many examples where one ltigant alone will
obiect to the imposition of a case management order and In so
doing, frustrate the stated purposes of the statutes and rules
designed to reduce delay in the trial courts).
15. See Dedrick, supra note 13, at 551.

16. ROBERT I. WEIL & IRA A. BROWN, IR,, CAL. PRAc. GUIDE.: CiViL
PROCEDURE BEFORE TRAL 12:5 (The Rutter Group 1996).
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tive and judicial systems must act to close
those loopholes that enable crafty litigants to
avoid the stated purpose of delay reduction.
While the extent of judicial authority to
control conventional litigation is clear, there
remains a need for specific and unclouded
authority in the field of complex litigation.
Some continue to object to CMOs as unduly
burdensome in this context. They argue that
case management orders are mere technical
procedural constraints, imposing on attorneys
and litigants alike an unfounded onus.'7
Though these criticisms may be valid, the
risks of uncontrolledcomplex litigation are too
significant to allow judicial acquiescence to
the complaints of attorneys who may rightly
have only their client's interests in mind. As
one judge has observed: "lfllinging sand in the
finely-tuned case management gears has the
unhappy potential for bringing the entire litigation to a grinding halt."'8 In addition, neither
plaintiffs, the government, nor industry profit
from litigation lasting years and accomplishing
little.
This note will explore the case management order debate in the following manner:
Section Two will examine briefly the nature and
definition of complex litigation. A catch phrase
in modem legal circles, its name seems selfdefining. Nonetheless, there is significant confusion and uncertainty surrounding the question of just what litigation may be described as
complex. The advocacy of case management
orders made in this note is made with respect
to the area of complex litigation only. An introductory analysis will afford the reader an
understanding of why case management
orders are so necessary to the successful adjudication of complex litigation. This note will
also explore the fact that both plaintiffs and
defendants can be financially devastated by
protracted, uncontrolled litigation and that
both stand to benefit from the imposition of
CMOs.
Section Two of this note will also offer an
introductory analysis of one type of complex
environmental litigation: the "toxic tort.' This
i7. See. e.g., FED. R.civ. P. 16 advisory committee's note.
18.

In re Recticel Foam Corp.. 859 F.2d

1000.

1004 (Ist Cir.
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type of complex litigation is important in the
CMO context because it was the unwitting parent of an offshoot of the case management
order, known as the -Lone Pine Order." " A brief
introduction to the background and legal theories associated with the toxic tort will enable
the reader to better comprehend the analysis
of the case management order within the toxic
tort context.
In Section Three, this note will analyze the
legal and statutory underpinnings of the case
management order, with a particular focus on
California law. Through an analysis of case law,
statutes and judicial rules, the reader will
come to understand the particular situations
where case management orders are most
applicable, where they are not useful, and
where they cannot be applied.
In addition, Section Three will provide an
examination of the case management order in
the toxic tort context specifically. When applied in toxic tort litigation, the case management order has come to be called a -Lone Pine
Order," for reasons fully explained below. The
CMO was initially applied in toxic torts just as
it is in other forms of complex litigation. But it
soon transformed into a new, and in many
ways more powerful, procedural tool. After
analyzing the case management order in the
toxic tort case, this note will briefly examine
the striking ultimate similarities between the
"Lone Pine Order" and another procedural tool,
the summary judgment.
Section Four will offer a brief proposal,
arguing for a clearer and more explicit legislative and judicial position in favor of case management orders. Rather than having the issue
slowly clarified by case law and court practice,
only to be muddied once again by the occasional renegade opinion, the legislature must
clarify the instances in which CMOs are appropriate. It must be emphasized that today,
CMOs are hardly a revolutionary idea. They are
one widely accepted feature of complex litigation, and their imposition usually goes unchallenged. Yet, the fact that cases continue to
come before appellate courts demonstrates
1988).
19

See discussion Ifra Section IILCI
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the need for further legislative clarification.
Section Five will conclude this note with a
brief summary and prediction regarding the
future of the case management order.
II. Background
A. Complex Litigation: Nature and
Definition
To understand the function of CMOs, one
must understand the context in which they
most commonly arise: complex litigation.
Attempts to define this apparently selfdescriptive term have been unsuccessful, if we
judge success by uniformity." Still, by providing a brief introduction to some of the definitions that have been offered, the reader should
achieve a basic understanding of complex litigation, rather than a meticulous mastery of the
"cacophony" of definitions offered for it.2' Such
an understanding will lead the reader to conclude that litigation defined as "complex"
stands to benefit from case management that
is "active," "substantive," "timely," "continuing,"
"firm, but fair" and "carefully prepared."22
The first definition of "complex litigation"
was appropriately offered in the first edition of
the Manual for Complex Litigation. It stated, in
part, that complex litigation included "one or
more related cases which present unusual
problems and
require extraordinary treatment, including but not limited to the cases
designated as 'protracted' and 'big."'23 This

unhelpful definition was abandoned in the second edition, with no attempt made to offer an
alternative.2' The third edition observed that a
"functional definition of complex litigation recognizes that the need for management
does
not simply arise from complexity, but is its
defining characteristic."2 '
Thus, in the view of the Manual, "Itlhe
20. See, e.g., Jay Ti'dmarsh, Unattainable Justice: The Form of
Complex Litigation and the Limits of judicial Power,60GEO. WASH. L. REV.

1683 (1992) (providing a thorough review of complex litigation
and the implications of the many attempts to define it).
21. Seeid.at1692.
22. Fed. Jud. Ctr., MANUAL FORcOmPLEX LITIGAMnON
§ 20.13
(3d ed. 1995).
23. Id.at § 10.1.
24. See id.
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greater the need for management, the more
'complex' is the litigation." 6 This definition
leaves the practitioner with the impression
that complexity is solely a function of how
much he or the court desires management.
While broad and encompassing, this definition
is vague in its simplicity. Its meaning has been
ethereally tied to a "need for management."27 It
provides no answer as to what makes litigation
complex in certain circumstances and routine
in others.
The Manual does go on to state, somewhat
cursorily, that "litigation involving many parties in numerous related cases
requires
management
as Idoesl litigation involving
large numbers of witnesses and documents
and extensive discovery." 8 The inadequacy of
the Manual's definition was surely intentional.
Its authors likely sought to avoid a rigid definition, in order to assure the widest application
of strict case management rules.
The California Standards of Judicial Administration for Complex Litigation define
complex litigation as "those cases that require
specialized management to avoid placing
unnecessary burdens on the couit or the litigants."29 The scope of this definition is immediately qualified, in that the Standards go on to
state that complex litigation "is not capable of
precise definition" and that it "may involve
multiple
related cases, extensive pretrial
activity, extended trial times, landl difficult or
novel issues." 0 The Standards state further that
"no particular criterion is controlling and each
situation must be examined separately."3'
A more thorough offering of factors that
help us determine when the term "complexity"
may be appropriately ascribed tc litigation is
available. Judge William Schwarzer describes
complex litigation as involving:
(1) complicated and unfamiliar prac25.

Id.

26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.

29.

CAL. StDs.

30.

Id.

31.

Id,

Or lUD.

ADMIN. §

19(c) (West 1998).
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tices, developed over a period of years,
requiring extensive oral and documentary evidence on both sides; (2) proof
of a pattern of conduct consisting of
numerous seemingly unrelated acts or
events; (3) rules of law stated with
constitution-like generality, leaving the
courts with little reliable guidance for
judging the relevance of evidence and
placing policy-making responsibility
on the trier of fact; and (4) technical
and economic issues foreign to Ithel
experience lof courts and juries.l n
Judge Schwarzer notes that the third and
fourth factors are always present in complex
cases, while the first and second are merely features of complex cases that may manifest themselves. 3
One author describes litigation as complex
"when the existing rules of pretrial, trial and
substantive law make the principled deliberation of a dispute highly problematic." Under

this calculus, a court would utilize CMOs, for
example, to protect the hallowed goal of -principled deliberation."3'
A summary of the varying definitions of
complex litigation is helpful: "Complex litigation lexistsl when there is (1) a need for case
management, or (2) pretrial complexity; or (3)
32. Tidmarsh. supra note 20. at 1717 (quoting Schwarzer.
MANAGING ANTITRUST AND OTHER COMPLEX uTIGATION (1982)).

33. Seeid. at 1717.
34. Id. at 1718.
35.

See id.

36. Id. at 1732.
37. Comprehensive Environmental Response. Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) of 1980. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-

9675. CERCLA is a federal law designed to mandate a uniform
approach to the cleanup of hazardous and toxic waste sites. The
Manual for Complex Litigation states that CERCLAs requirements have resulted in a unique form of complex litigation, and

that -the number of parties and issues typically calls for treating
CERCLA cases as complex litigation. Fed. judicial Ctr., MANuAL.
FOR COMPLEX Lmcamon, at § 33.7 (3d ed. 1995).

CERCLAalone is not responsible for the result noted by the
Manual, however it is one example of how the host of laws and
regulations promulgated in recent decades have led to increased
litigation in general, and increased complex litigation In particular. A comprehensive discussion of CERCLA and its Implications

would be too voluminous and beyond the scope of this note.
However, CERCLA should be understood to represent one major

lkcase MVWe 0&
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trial complexity; or (4) remedial complexity; or
(5) multi-party, multi-forum litigation , " In

practice, cases typically termed complex include antitrust, mass or toxic torts, CERCLA7
litigation, employment discrimination cases
and patent cases.6
After briefly describing a few definitions
and explanations of the term 'complex litigation," it becomes clear why no one has put forth
a universally accepted definition of this increasingly prevalent feature of America's judicial system." Ultimately, given the fact that we are
attempting to define 'complex,' must it follow
that any definition be similarly so? Perhaps, but
for the purposes of this note, the above intro-

duction to the nature and definition of complex
litigation should suffice.
B. The Toxic TorLt History and

Development'
The toxic tort lawsuit is a variation on a normal tort in which a plaintiff 'claims injury to his
n
I Certainly, environmental
health or property.
litigation itself is nothing new, and can be
traced as far back as the time of the Romans.4
The toxic tort of today differs from -pollution
cases" of the past in that the materials used
today for industrial, commercial, agricultural
and residential purposes are much more deadly than their naturally occurring predecessors,
given the advancement in synthetic chemical
example of how a changing governmental stance toward managIng and regulating the environment resulted in the growth and
development of environmental and other complex litigation.
38

See Fed. ludicial Ctr. MANuAL roi CoMPtmx LricmoN. at

ixx (3d ed. 1995J,
39 SeTidmarsh. supr, note 20, at 1731,
40. The purpose of this section is merely to introduce the
reader to the nascent form of environmental litigation known as
the toxic tort- There exist, however, extensive analyses of toxic
tort litigation, both within case law and scholarly articles. For the
reader interested in pursuing a more comprehensive understandIng of both the history and development of the toxic tort. as well
as its nature within modem courtrooms see, Robert F Blomquist.
md 1979-1967. 10 PACE
Artencan Toxic Tort Law An Histoncal Backgru
ENvTI L Rev, 85 (1992J; Richard I Lippes. Environmental and Toxic
Tort Liltgaimo, C317AU-ABA493, lune 20. 1988: Carol E Dinkins,
et al. Ownw ofEnvironm"al and Toic Tort bligaiox. SAM8 ALlABA 441. 451, March 28, 1996; JONAiHw.v HA, A CImL AcnoN
(1995); Shawn A, Copeland, et al.Carrrnt Issues in Toic Tort
Liigahion,.SC64 AU-ABA 64, lanuary 22, 1998.
41. Ltppes supra note 40.at 495.
42 Sm id
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production in recent decades. Today, severe
symptoms and even death often characterize
exposure to such materials. Further, given the
latent effect such materials often have, illness
or reactions may not manifest themselves for
years. And even if death or injury results, a
causal relationship may not be established for
some time. Finally, given the incredibly widespread usage of potentially toxic manufactured
materials, large numbers of people may be
exposed.
These facts, coupled with often dramatic
news coverage of toxic tort cases, combine to
greatly heighten the frequency 3 with which
such cases present themselves in America's
courts." As a result, "the complexities involved in the proof or defense of the toxic tort
case, as well as the number of plaintiffs and
defendants involved in such litigation, make
issues of case management of paramount
importance."4'
Within the last thirty years, environmental
legislation and accompanying litigation have
become a unique and significant area of
jurisprudence. The term "toxic torts" can trace
its heritage to this new area of law.' Not long
ago, environmental concerns were addressed
by local laws and the local common law of nuisance. A nuisance claim arises when a "defendant engages in activity which significantly
interferes with the [pllaintiff's use and enloyment of property."4 Moreover, before the now

broad expanse of environmental case law
developed, nuisance law was typically applied
to litigious issues like pollution of private
property or physical injury resulting therefrom." It soon became clear that the applica-

tion of nuisance doctrine was "ill-suited to

1odumne
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urban environments with area-wide sources,
and the area-wide dispersal of pollution."49
While pollution disputes of the past were
resolved according to local nuisance laws, this
changed as federal involvement in the promulgation of environmental statutes and administrative rules increased. Yet, the federal government's involvement in environmental law is
also a relatively new phenomenon."
Other legal theories can serve as the basis
for a "pollution" or contamination lawsuit,
including trespass, inverse condemnation,
negligence, strict liability and strict product
liability." In a trespass action, the contamination constitutes a "direct invasion [with substantial resulting harm] of the property by the
polluting substance
Iwithl the specific
intent on the part of the defendant to take that
action that ultimately results in te contamination coming on the plaintiff's property."" A
party may bring an inverse condemnation
action only against the government, and
results when "government takes an action
which so adversely affects a property owner's
use and enjoyment of his property so that the
value significantly diminishes."'3 The strict liability for abnormally dangerous activity is also
available as a potential basis for a toxic tort
lawsuit. The Restatement (Second) of Torts
states that "lolne who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to liability for
harm to the person, land, or chattels of another resulting from the activity, although he has
exercised the utmost care to prevent the
harm." 14
The preceding history serves as the analytical framework from which modern toxic tort
law emerged. It is widely acknowledged that

43. Some might argue that the issue is not the frequency of
complex toxic tort cases that necessitates the use of CMOs,but
rather it is the enormity of the number of claimants and the complexity and size of the individual case that requires courts to
Impose CMOs. The author's response to this position is partial
agreement, partial disagreement.True, the size and complexity of
the Individual case necessitates the CMO for that case. But the
need for CMOs on a systematic basis (a position which forms the
basis of this note) is more attributable to the increasing number of
complex toxic tort cases being litigated, rather than solely
Increasing complexity for a fixed number of cases.

45.

44. See Frances C. Whiteman, Toxic Emotional Distress Clains:
The Emergiffg Trend for Recovery Absent Physical injury, 20CAP. U. L. REv.
995, 996 (1991).

Lippes, supra note 40, at 495.

46. See Dinkins, supra note 40, at 451.
47.

Lippes, supra note 40, at 496,

48. See Dinkins, supra note 40, at 451.
49.

Id.

50.

See id.

51.

See Lippes. supra note 40, at 498-505.

52.

Id.at 498.

53.

Id.at 499.

54

Id. at 502 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts

§519).
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American toxic tort law was born in 1979, dur-

ing the litigation involving Agent Orange,"
when the term was first used in a judicial
opinion.' In this litigation, plaintiffs claimed
exposure to the defoliant Agent Orange, used
during the Vietnam War. The judge in the
Agent Orange litigation made several discerning observations of the litigation before him,
noting traits that would come to characterize
many toxic tort cases. The court noted:
1) a large number of plaintiffs and
potential plaintiffs;
2) numerous defendants;
3) plaintiffs from many states, even
different countries;
4) difficult and complex causation
issues;
5) numerous questions of law;
6) as yet unperceived or unknown effects
of exposure;
7) numerous scientific and medical
issues;
8) ambivalent or resistant involved parties;
9) significant public policy concerns;
10) a wide variety of procedural tools
available for use in controlling the litigation."
After the Agent Orange litigation, courts
used the now familiar phrase 'toxic tort' to
describe "environmental exposure cases, occupational exposure disputes, product liability
actions, and cases involving insurance
claims."'
Not only have modern toxic torts come to
often involve large numbers of both plaintiffs
and defendants, the stakes are often incredibly
high. " Damages in toxic tort cases are
55. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig.. 506 F Supp. 762
(E.D.N.Y. 1980) IhereinafterAgent Orangej.
56. See Blomquist, supra note 40, at 85.
57. Agent Orange. 506 E Supp. at 783-84.
58. Blomquist, supra note 40,at 172.
59. See Robb Tretter, Stop Fishingin the Pond and Head Back to
the Stream: Personallunsdicton in Mass Toac Torts 1995 ANN.SuRy. Am.

The ~sa
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renowned for their enormity. The immensity of
the money damages to be won or lost in a toxic
tort case serves as another reason why strict
case management is needed in such cases.
While avoiding unnecessary speculation as to
the desperate measures to which both plaintiffs
and defendants may resort to with millions,
even billions of dollars at stake, strict case
management is clearly a necessity.
Because toxic torts involve technical factual scenarios, a large number of plaintiffs, a large
number of defendants and often a large
amount of money, such cases quickly become
complex. As such, they are especially well suited to the advantages associated with case management orders.
III. Analysis
A. Theory and Doctrine In Complex
Litigation: The California CMO
What is a case management order? What
are its roots, and what are some of the reasons
used to justify its application? A case management order, ideally, 'lays out a clear path and
timetable for the completion of all tasks necessary to ready the case for trial."' The California
example of case management is found in the
Trial Court Delay Reduction Act.' California's
approach is representative of general notions
of case management. It effectuates a rearrangement of responsibilities in that "lllawyers and
clients no longer control the pace of litigation
it is the court's responsibilityto 'actively manage' each case.** Section 19 of the
Standards of Judicial Administration addresses
the methods by which a case management
order accomplishes this oblective ' Specifically, section 19(g) describes some of the oblectives a preliminary trial conference, one frequent requirement of the case management
order, may seek to attain." The objectives of
such a conference include:
L 603. 605-6 (1996).
60.

Lu v, Super ct. 55 Cal. App, 4th 1264. 1268 (1997).

61

See CLGoV TCOE § 68600 (West 1998).

62. WEIL & Bww.w, supra note 16, at 124
63.

CAL STDS. OF IuM Ao v.i § 19ig) (West 1998),

64

Id
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(I) settle the pleadings;
(2) determine whether severance, consolidation, or coordination with other
actions is desirable;
(3) schedule discovery proceedings;
(4) issue protective orders;
(5) arrange settlement conferences;
(6) appoint liaison counsel, lwhose
responsibility it is to coordinate
and/or manage the relationship
between the often numerous attorneys present in complex litigation];
(7) providing for exchange of documents;
(8) require a list of deponents and a
statement of the general purpose of
the depositions;
(9) opening a judge's working file;
(I 0)organize a comprehensive list of mail
addresses and telephone numbers of
counsel."
Further elaborating on the effect and purpose of section 19, the court in Vermeulen v.
Supenor Court stated that "section 19 is designed
to facilitate pretrial resolution of evidentiary
and other issues, and to minimize the time and
expense of lengthy and/or multiple trials.""
Strict case management and its derivative,
the case management order, have met with
widespread judicial and legislative approval.67
In a seminal case, one California appellate
court upheld the constitutionality of the
California Trial Delay Reduction Act, which delegated to the judicial council and trial courts
65. Id.
66. 204Cal.App. 3d 192, 1196(1988).
67. But see Estate of Meeker v. Kleinbauer, 13 Cal. App. 4th
1099 (1993) (rejecting a tnal court's decision to impose a CMO on
the grounds that it intruded too far on the nghts of the litigants).
68. See Laborers' Int'l Union of N. Am., Local 89 v. El
Dorado Landscape Co., 208 Cal. App. 3d 993 (1989).
69. Lu, 55 Cal. App. 4th at 1268.
70. Id. at 1269.
71. In re Recticel Foam Corp., 859 F.2d 1000, 1004 ( Ist Cir.
1988).
72. The number of statutes and rules promulgated by the
judicial council is too numerous to be listed here, but for the

'the power to experiment with case management techniques in order to reduce the delay
that had come to often symbolize civil proceedings.'
Further highlighting the prevailing judicial
acceptance of legislative efforts to reduce delay
in the trial courts, the court in Lu v Supenor
Court observed that a "case management order
assists trial judges in carrying out their responsibilities
"69 The court further noted that
"[ulnless managed, la complex casel with many
separately represented parties has the potential for burdensome and duplicative discovery."0 To be sure, courts confronted with complex litigation are particularly fond of CMOs.
One court even termed the CMO "one of the
court's trustiest tools."7
The voluminous nature of statutory and
judicial pronouncements on the issue of complex case management is a testament to the
fact that courts are fully expected to manage
that litigation. 2 "Case management orders also
permit trial judges to carry out their responsibilities under Government Code section 68607,
subdivision (a), to 'actively monitor, supervise
'"7
and control the movement of all cases
But courts have gone beyond mere tacit
approval of case management orders as they
are today understood. In Lu, the appellate
court observed that "trial judges should be
encouraged to use their inherent powers under
Code of Civil Procedure section 18711 to manage such complex cases in the most efficient
and expeditious manner."" Complex cases
stand to benefit from the type of authority
afforded to trial courts by section 187 Since
this code section is so sweeping and the need
reader interested in further analysis thereof, see generally
GOVT CODE § 68600 (West 1998).

CAL.

73. Lu, 55 Cal. App. 4th at 1268-69 (quoting CAL, Gov. CoDE
§ 68607 (West 1998)).
74.

Section 187 provides: "When jurisdi.ton Is

con-

ferred on a court or judicial officer, all the means necessary to
carry it into effect are also given; and in the exercise of this jurisdiction, if the course of proceeding be not specifically pointed
out by this code or the statute, any suitableproces; or mode of proceeding may be adopted which may appear most ccnformable to the
spirit of this code." CAL Civ. PROC. CODE § 187 (emphasis added).
Section 187 is frequently cited as a powerful statutory rationale
for upholding a trial court's usage of Its "inherent powers"
inferred from this code section.
75. Lu, 55 Cal. App. 4th at 1271 (emphasis added).
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for the unhindered management by the trial
court judge presiding over a complex case is
often so great, section 187 serves as a powerful
rationale for permitting judges broad discretion
in exercising their supervisory and managerial
powers.
Yet, as courts have not merely expressed
tacit approval, neither have they stopped at
encouraging compliancewith a particularrule of
court, as in Lu. Indeed, courts have gone as far
as to encourage novel, creative approaches for
trial courts handling complex cases.16 One
author has further observed that case management orders should be "the product of the attorneys' and the court's creativity."n The appellate
court in Cottle v. SupenorCourt validated such a
"flexible"approach when it observed that"Iclase
law and various statutory provisions give courts
broad and inherent powers and serve as the
sources for thL authority to issue such an
order."
Thus, the case management order is a powerful tool commonly utilized by the trial court in
handling complex litigation. It gives the court
the authority to control the litigation to a
greater extent than it would be able to do were
that authority not present. It is a tool that finds
the greatest utility in cases classified as complex, and its application is generally limited to
such classifications.And it is in this field of litigation, so daunting in what it typically encompasses, where it is of such great use. It is a powerful tool, but it is also one whose validity,
though seemingly now resolved by the courts,
discontented parties continue to challenge in
appeals, resulting in the same form of delay this
tool was designed to obviate. Still, the growing
popularity of case management orders is "part
of a trend which recognizes that discovery land
pretrial stages in general] must be a more efficient part of the dispute resolution process."'
76. See Cottle v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. App. 4th 1367
(1992).
77. Dedrick, supra note 13, at 547.
78. 3 Cal. App. 4th at i376.
79. Dale A.Cin & Richard 1.Gray, Illinos
Discory Refon: A
Rationale, Rules, and Result. 16 Rv. LmG. 303.319 (1997).
80. 55cal.App.4th i264.
81. id.
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B. Case Management Orders In California
1. Lu v. SuperiorCourf"
Lu v. Superior Court provides an excellent,
contemporary example of complex litigation
subject to a case management order.' It also
serves as a highly cogent illustration of the fact
that litigants continue to challenge case management orders in appellate courts, even in
jurisdictions extraordinarily friendly to the
"pragmatic objectives' they serve.' Lu is one of
a host of opinions that generally address the
applicability and suitability of case management orders."
Lu involved a construction defect case,
designated as complex." Upon this designation by the court, a case management order
was accordingly issued. Petitioner Lu oblected
to that imposition, and particularly to the
appointment of a discovery referee whose role
included mediation.8 It should be noted that
"lalIll parties, except ILul, agreed to the terms
of the case management order and urged its
adoption."M This should come as no surpnse
since most litigants appreciate the presence of
the court's guiding hand, especially in complex
litigation.
Courts and parties alike stand to benefit
from the imposition of case management
orders, and most such parties recognize this
and willingly accept the imposition thereof.
Indeed, most litigants probably realize this, as
evidenced by the Lu case, and refrain from
bringing challenges to CMOs. Such an assumption is inferentially confirmed by the fact that
while courts impose a large number of CMOs,
relatively few find their way into appellate challenges.
Indeed, the appellate court in Lu observed
that a complex case "presents case management problems which make it beneficial for the
parties as well as the court to employ the level
of case management contemplated by the com82

Se Cfd

George Tnufing spr note i.

83. Though Lu is not a toxic tort case, the Justifications for

CMOs that it provides are easily applied to such cases, since the
underlying procedural argument is the same.
84. 55cal.App.4that 1266.
85 See id at 1267.
86 Id.(emphasis added)-
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plex litigation standard." 7 Moreover, the court
observed that the case management order was
"[a Iuseful tool, employed by many judges managing complex litigation."' Speaking directly to
the issue raised by the petitioner on appeal, the
court stated that "a trial court has authority to
appoint a discovery referee, even in the
absence of a current discovery dispute.""9 The
petitioner's claim that the court lacked the
authority to appoint a discovery referee by way
of a case management order was therefore
rejected outright."
Thus, Lu v. SupenorCourtstands for the principle that case management orders are both
valid and useful. It also articulates the legal
justifications for the imposition of a CMO. It
serves as a fundamental example of why clearer and more explicit legislative action is needed, both to respond to and allow similarly wellreasoned judicial responses to attacks on the
case management order.
2. Limitations on the Imposition of a Case
Management Order
While the power of the courts to manage
cases before them is extensive, as exemplified
by Code of Civil Procedure section 187,9 limitations exist, and like most powers of government, the authority of the Iudiciary does not go
unchecked. Thus, while such limitations are
few, knowing these limits is necessary to an
understanding of the scope and role of the
case management order.
For the sake of space, one major limitation
can only be discussed briefly, but is worth noting since it often plays a role in whether case
management orders may be applied to a particular form of complex litigation. Certainly,
the legislature in its wisdom recognized that
while the reduction of delay was of paramount
interest, especially in complex cases, certain
exceptions would sometimes be warranted,
given particular circumstances. California Rule
of Court 2105 describes a system of designat-

ing the length of time provided for trial commencement, based on a showing by the litigants that the statutorily prescribed limit is
inapplicable to their particular case.9 The Rule
recognizes that certain forms of complex litigation will be "so unique" as to be exempt from
case management treatment whe'e "they cannot be ready for trial within twenty-four
months."3 In such a case "the court shall estimate the maximum time that will reasonably
be required to.dispose of each case in a just
4
and efficient manner.""
Rule 2106 provides a list of factors that the
court should use in making a determination as
to whether a case before it is sufficiently
"unique" to warrant the special treatment the
rule contemplates." The following factors
determine whether a case designated as complex will be subject to an exemption or additional time to commence trial:
I) the type of action and the subject matter of the action;
2) the number of causes of action or affirmative defenses alleged;
3) the number of parties or groups of parties with separate interests;
4) the number of cross-complaints, types
action and the subject matter;
5) the, complexity of substantive and procedural issues, including issues of first
impression;
6) the difficulty in identifying, locating,
and serving adverse parties;
7) the nature and extent of discovery
anticipated;
8) the number and location of percipient
and expert witnesses;
9) the estimated length of trial or successive trials;
10) whether some or all issues can be arbitrated;

87. Id.

92.

CAL. RULE OFCT. §

88. Id.

93.

Id.

89.

94. Id

Id.at 1266.

90. See id. at 1267.
91.

See discussion supra note 72.

2105 (West 1998).

95. CAL. RULE'oFCT.§ 2106 (West 1998).
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11) statutory priority for some or all of the
issues;

12) the likelihood of writ or other appellate
proceedings,
13) the amount in controversy and the type
of remedy sought, including measure
of damages.'
The factors listed in Rule 2106 constitute
one important manner by which case management orders may be deemed inapplicable by a
trial or appellate court. As a consequence,
these factors will, if determined applicable,
abrogate the use and efficacy of case management orders, altering or eliminating entirely
the exacting deadlines which a strict case management philosophy seeks to meet.
Other weaker limitations on the applicability of case management orders also exist. In
one case, DeBlase v. Supenor Court, an indigent
plaintiff objected to the appointment of a discovery referee.' Such an appointment is one
manner in which case management orders typically manifest themselves. The appellate court
vacated the trial court's order of appointment,
stating specifically that given the petitioner's
indigence, and the fact that discovery issues
did not raise complex or time-consuming
issues, the trial court should not have ordered
the appointment." DeBlase has been interpreted to provide that "lilf a party demonstrates
that the costs associated with a ICMOI impose
a significant hardship, it would be inappropriate for the court to order that party to contribute" to the costs associated with, for example, the appointment of a referee.9
Further examples of limitations on the
court's ability to manage cases before it are
available. For instance, in Kirschenman v. Supenor Court, the court attempted to compel the
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
I01.
102.

Id.
41 Cal.App.4th 1279(1996).
See id. at 1286.
Lu. 55 Cal. App. 4th at 1269-70.
30 Cal. App. 4th 832 (1994).
Id.at835.
CAL Bus. & PROF. CODE § 467.7 (West 1998)."Nothing In
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parties to participate in the private mediation
to which they had earlier agreed, but where
one party had later reconsidered.w The court
then sanctioned the parties for their failure to
participate. The Califomia appellate court stated that "the Itriall court had no statutory
authority to require the parties to participate in
mediation.' 0 '
Support for the position taken by the
appellate court is found in Business and
Professions Code section 467.7, which effectively allows the parties to withdraw from
mediation regardless of whether or not the
judge wishes the parties to continue.'1 This
seeming restraint placed on trial courts was
distinguished in Lu, however, when the court
stated that it did "not think it appropriate to
extend Kirschenrman to complex litigation...."1
Thus, while statutory restraints on the ability of
the court to compel participation in mediation
admittedly exist, no drastic inference of the
judge's overall ability to control the proceedings of a complex case should be drawn, other
than those specifically mandated by statute. 0'
Another example of a restraint placed on
the judicial power to control cases subject to it
comes from Hogoboom v. Supenor Court."° There,
courts were prohibited from requiring the parties to pay a referee's fees in family law and
domestic violence cases. Both the Legislature
and the Judicial Council have more extensive
rules, discussed below, related to the underlying issue raised in Hogoboom. Namely, these
rules are that certain types of cases are not
arguably subject to the same sorts of policy
rationale justifying the imposition of CMOs in
complex litigation.'1
The delay reduction theories that serve as
the legal foundation of case management
orders have been statutorily ruled inapplicable
to certain types of cases. These include domestic
relation proceedings, probate, juvenile,
this chapter shall be construed to prohibit any person who voluntarily enters the dispute resolution process from revoking his

or her consent.

-i

(emphasis added).

103. 55Cal App. 4th at i270.
i04 See idat 1270-71,
105. 5iCal App.4th653(I996).
106 See, eq.VWUL& Bowm.,suprv note 16,at I 12:20(citIng CA. GovT Cooc 4 68608(a). 68605.5. 68608(a) (West 1998)).
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guardianship, conservatorship, family law and
small claims appeals.'"7 Beyond state and judicial
exclusions are local exclusions, which may elaborate and expand on the limitations imposed by
the legislature or the state judiciary."'
There is logic to the decision by many
California jurisdictions to exclude certain types of
litigation from the delay reduction treatment that
accompanies formal case management orders.
Typically, cases falling under the designations
enumerated above would rarely be classified as
the sort of "complex" litigation to which case
management orders so well apply. Therefore, any
advocacy of CMOs in such types of litigation is
not only misplaced, but unnecessary. Even if
such a case were classified as "complex," the
decision not to subject it to stringent case management standards would nonetheless be sensible.
The classes of cases listed above have a common theme, easily perceptible. They all involve,
in one form or another, cases directly affecting
individuals whose need for protection from the
court outweighs the interest of the State in
speedy adjudication. And the legislature has
determined, wisely it seems, that to apply case
management deadlines to such cases would be
inappropriate.
3. CMOs in the Context of Californias Local
Rules
Understanding the relationship between
state and judicially imposed case management
techniques and the local rules which modify and
expand upon them is key to understanding
CMOs and case management in general. What is
the general position of the courts with regard to
the enforceability of local case management
rules, especially as compared to sometimes conflicting or dissimilar state rules? For example,
under what conditions may a trial court validly
dismiss an action before it for violation of local
case management rules, and when are such dismissals typically set aside?
107. In addition, the Judicial Council includes a -catchall"
In the form of excluding "other civil petitions,- which apply to
topics as varied as temporary restraining orders to name
changes. See id. at 1 12:23 (citing CAL. RULE OF CT. 2103 (West
1998); STANDARDS OF iUD. ADMIN. § 2. i(e) (West 1998)).
108. See, e.g., ORANGE COUNTY SUP. CT. RULE 431 (West 1998)
(excluding cases ranging from personal injury and eminent

That a local trial court may "adopt its own
procedures, standards and policies for delay
reduction" is undisputed.'" In addition, as discussed below, case law reveals that trial courts
have great latitude both in the adoption and
enforcement of local rules of court. Still, the
enforcement of local rules may be restrained at
times. Before examining such instances however,
it may be of some use to provide the reader with
an example of a local rule of case management.
One such example may be found in Orange
County Superior Court Rule 450, which orders
that a "final case management conference" must
be held, wherein the parties and the court "meet
and conduct an issue conference." '0 At this conference, the parties:
(1) exchange exhibits and inspect photos
and diagrams (to be submitted on the
date of trial), excluding those contemplated to be used for impeachment or
rebuttal;
(2) stipulate to all facts amenable to stipulation;
(3) prepare a Joint Statement of the Case;
(4) prepare a Joint Witness List, excluding
impeachment or rebuttal witnesses;
(5) prepare a Joint List of Controverted
Issues (required for both ju-y and
nonjury trials);
(6) exchange motions in limine;
(7) prepare voir dire questions for the
court to include in its voir dire (jury
trials only);
(8) execute the Statement of
Compliance."'
Two important cases demonstrate that trial
courts employing conflicting local and state
case management rules may have the authority to manage cases limited, while courts
employing harmonious state and local rules
domain to adoption and uninsured motorist cases).
109. WEIL & BROWN, supra note 16, at 12.48, (citing CAL,
GoV'r CODE § 68612 (West 1998)).
110. Id. at
(West 1998)).
III.

1998).

12:88.5 (citing ORANGE COUNTY SUP, Cr. RULE 450

ORANGE COUNTY SUPER. CT. RULES, RJLE 450 (West
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will likely not. Intennsurance Exchange of the
Automobile Club of Southern California v. Faura provides an example of a court employing conflicting local and state case management
rules." 2 There, the court held that "the trial
court abused its discretion by requiring parties to attend a status conference after they
had complied with California Rules of Court,
rule 525(c).""13 Thus, the court held that the
trial court could not superimpose local rules
onto parties who had already met the requirements of a state statute, when doing so would
yield a conflicting result. As the court directly
observed, "requiring that the parties utilize a
local 'suggested' procedure [will] not trump
rule 525(c)." '"
The court in Faura acknowledged that
Government Code Section 68608(b)"' could be
viewed as permitting broad application of
local rules. Yet, the important message of
Faura is that while a local rule may indeed be
broadly enforced, such enforcement is less
likely where doing so would result in the subordination of a state rule. And indeed, such an
assertion is in line with the legally recognized
reality of local versus state law. For example,
in Hock v. Superior Court, the court correctly
observes that generally local rules are invalid
6
if inconsistent with higher law."
A case nearly indistinguishable from Faura
on its facts, but which nevertheless achieved a
different result, offers an example of the
exception to the above rule. In California
Casualty Indemnity Insurance Company v. Mendoza,
112. 44 Cal. App. 4th 839(1996).
113. Id.at 844. California Rule of Court 525 provides In relevant part- "(a) Ifa case issettled plaintiff shall Immediatelygive
the court and any arbiter witten notice. The plaintiff shall also
immediatey give oral notice if a hearing, conference, or trial Is
imminent
(c) If the settlement agreement conditions dismissal on the satisfactory completion of specified terms that are
not to be performed within 45 days after the dates of settlement.
the notice settlement shall specify the date dismissal Is to be
filed."
(West 1998). it is worthy to note that In Lobrs Inrl
the
court recognized that Rule 525 adequately reconciles "the need
for expeditious processing of civil matters with the rights of individual litigants." 208 Cal. App. 3d at 1004 (quoting Moyal v.
Lanphear 208 Cal. App. 3d 491.500 (1989)).
114. Faurni 44 al. App. 4th at 843.
115. Section 68608(b) provides In relevant part- "judges
shall have all the powers to impose sanctions authorized by law.
including the power to dismiss actions
if It appears that less

The
(kd&
Mwc~iunegt 0&
Case AmowW
lbs Cm

the appellate court upheld a trial courts decision to dismiss for violation of a local rule.""
The difference here was that the state and
local rules were not in conflict. No party had
complied with a state rule but failed to comply
with a local rule, as in Faura."'9 Rather, in this
case, counsel attempted to "dictate what hearings a trial court may hold . landl to bypass
the trial court to challenge the necessity of
court appearances. " "
Despite the conflicting approaches that
courts sometimes take in determining the
enforceability of local case management rules,
the legislature, through California Civil
Procedure section 575.2(b) has made clear
that where counsel is responsible for the failure to comply with local rules, penalties may
be imposed accordingly.'" This pronouncement is not as helpful as it could be, and
courts have split on the issue of counsel violating local 'fast track" rules. Some case law
has interpreted California Civil Procedure section 575.2(b) as disallowing courts to dismiss
cases for violation of local rules, including
local rules designed to expedite the progress
of the case, for example. 2 '
While substantial limitations imposed on
the trial court are rare with regard to case
management, such limitations nevertheless
exist, and case management is by no means
the perfect solution by which trial courts may
extinguish the antagonistic presence of delay.
This underlying conflict between the growing
pressure on the judiciary to expedite cases and
severe sanctions would not be effective.
ludges are encouraged to Impose sanctions to achieve the purposes of this article."
CAL Gov'T Coon § 68608(b) twest 1996).
116, 221 Ca App, 3d670,673 (1990).
117. 36Cal App 4th 678 (I995).
118, 44 CalApp. 4th at 839.
119, Men
, 36 Cal. App. 4th at 681.
120. CA Ov, Poc. Coo § 575.2 (West 1998). Section (a)
states "Local rules promulgated pursuant to Section 575.1 may
provide that if any counsel
falls to comply with any of the
requirements thereof, the court ... may... dismiss the action or
proceeding or any part thereof." Id.Section (b) explains that the
Intent of the Legislature is "thatif a failure to comply with these
rules Is the responsibility of counsel and not of the party, any
penalty shall be imposed on counsel and shall not adversely
affect the party s cause of action or defense thereto: Id
121 See Moyal v. Lanphear 208 Cal. App. 3d 491 (1989).
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the desire to maintain the role of the courts as
an arena for conflict resolution stands as one
of the greatest tasks facing the judiciary today.
Indeed, one court neatly phrased the challenge
facing the judiciary when it noted that a "balance must be struck between the trial court's
right to run a tight ship and its obligation to
22
provide a meaningful forum for litigants."
Nevertheless, reflecting the general state
of conflict on the issue of whether or not courts
may dismiss cases for violations of local rules,
some courts32 have interpreted Government
Code section 68608(b),'2 rather than California
Civil Procedure section 75.2(b),'" to allow
courts to dismiss for violations of local rules. 16
Other courts 2 have ruled that a trial court
should only dismiss where it finds that less
severe sanctions would likely be ineffective in
securing conformity with local case management rules.

2

Further elaboration on this "local rules"
trend may be found in Simmons v. City of
Pasadena.'2 9 There, the court set aside a dis-

missal ordered when the litigants violated a
local "fast track" rule. The court in Simmons
ruled that such local rules are unenforceable
unless adopted under California Civil
Procedure section 575.1.'" Finally, in Estate of
Meeker v. Kleinbauer, the court stated that it
could find "no authority for the proposition
that disobedience of an informally distributed
memorandum explaining the court's requirements justifies the [dismissall imposed in this
3
case." '
This dispute between the courts of appeal
was recently addressed. The California
Supreme Court at least partially resolved the
split amongst the lower courts in Garcia v.
122. Estate of Meekerv. Kleinbauer, 13 Cal. App. 4th 1099.
1105 (1993).
123. See, eg.. Intel Corp. v. USAIR, Inc. 228 Cal. App. 3d
1559 (1991).
124,

See supra note 115.

125.

Seesupra note 120.

126, See WElL & BROWN. supra note 16, at 1 12:95.1, 12:96
(citing Intel Corp., 228 Cal App. 3d 1559).
127. See, e.g.. Ricard v. Grobstein, 6 Cal. App. 4th 157
(1992).
128. See WFlL & BROWN, supra note 16, at 1 12:96.1 (citing
Intel Corp., 228 Cal. App. 3d 1559 and Ricard, 6 Cal. App. 4th 157).

McCutchen.3

2

There, the Court stated that

"under the governing statutes, a court may not
impose this sanction Idismissall if noncompliance is the responsibility of counsel, not of the
litigant."' Thus, it is the position of the Court
that any attempt to portray section 68608(b)
"as creating a dismissal power that is both
independent of and greater than the court's
power under section 575.2(b)" is inconsistent
with the legislature's intent behind CCP section 575.2.'1

Despite the kaleidoscope of local rules of
case management, and the seeming conflict
among the courts as to their enforcement, one
may generally expect courts ruling on the
enforceability thereof to affirm. As demonstrated above, most local rules do not result in conflict with state case management statutes and
rules. Typically, such local rules merely complement or modify statewide rules As some of
the preceding cases illustrate, however, reviewing courts will not hesitate to proscribe the
enforcement of local rules where conflict
would result, or where they would be inappropriate under applicable statutes.

C. CMOs: Industry's Darling In Toxic Tort
Cases?
1. The "Lone Pine Order"
The case management order has come to
occupy a special place in the world of toxic tort
litigation. As the section detailing the background of the toxic tort describes, 3 ' this type of
complex litigation is especially well suited to
the function that case management orders
serve. Early on, a toxic tort case proceeded, as
129. 40cal.App.4thSupp. I(1995).
130. Section 575.1 of the California Code of Civil
Procedure provides that "proposed revisions be published and
submitted to local bar for consideration, and when final, copies
to be filed with the ludicial Council and all county law libraries."
WEIL & BROWN, supra note 16, at 1 12:51.1.
131. 13Cal.App. 4that 1104(1993).
132. 16 Cal. 4th 469 (1997).
133. Id,
at 471.
134. Id.
135. See supra Section l.B.
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does most litigation, with discovery coming

before trial. Yet, the technical nature of trying a
toxic tort case and the significance of mastering the voluminous material that accompanies
such litigation often presented defendants
with a sort of "cruel trilemma."'3 Should a) the
litigation proceed, possibly at a high cost; or b)
should the litigation be settled; or c) should
the defendant merely -hold out" against the
plaintiff, hoping the plaintiff will drop the
case? Clearly, plaintiffs recognized that the
monumental task of responding to a complaint
often led industry to settle cases, rather than
incur huge litigation costs and face possibly
negative publicity.'
Indeed, since toxic tort cases typically
involve highly complex and technical issues,
the task of plaintiffs has been simplified since
the government has undertaken the prodigious
responsibility of collecting and analyzing the
"massive amounts of data regarding the use of
hazardous materials."'1 Such a simplification,
coupled with an increasing number of materials proven by science to cause ailments, naturally results in a greater number of legitimate
filings by plaintiffs.' 9 Still, the mere availability of information does not make the plaintiff's
job an easy one. In environmental litigation,
for example, plaintiffs are often represented by
non-profit, financially weak public interest
groups, attempting to litigate against corporations with market capitalizations well into the
billions.
Though unfortunate, the number of invalid
claims filed by plaintiffs looking to industry as
a deep pocket would necessarily increase as
well, if only as a function of the greater number
overall of toxic tort claims before the courts.

The Cr~e Mox~m&t ~kd&
Trial courts and defendants alike are confronted with the responsibility of sorting out claims
based on injury and reality from those based
on avarice and myth. "* They must make such a
determination while simultaneously avoiding
the sort of protracted procedural wrangling
that so often seems to characterize complex litigation.
Counsel representing industry, assisted by
a judiciary eager to discourage questionable
and false claims marching under a toxic tort
banner, have sufficiently manipulated the
notion of case management so that plaintiffs
who are unable to make a prima facie case"" of
their injuries face likely dismissal."2 It is also
permissible for courts to require expert testimony from a plaintiff to establish his prima
facie claim of injury."' One author described
the purpose of this new form of CMO thusly:
"itoseparate real claims from those that are
feigned or frivolous, the courts developed a
requirement that plaintiffs seeking recovery for
mental harm must produce some form of
objective corroboration of their subjective
complaints."'" Truly, the ultimate purpose of
the toxic tort CMO is to "forcel I plaintiffs to
substantiate exposure, injury and causation. ""*
Within the context of toxic torts. CMOs
assume a more powerful form than in conventional complex cases. They go beyond the
established purposes of general case management orders. Indeed, when applied in the complex toxic tort, their purpose is to screen
invalid or unsubstantiated claims." Generally,
a court may require that a plaintiff in a toxic
tort case present prima facie evidence "that
defendants caused plaintiffs' exposure to toxic
contamination and that the exposure caused,

136. The famous phrase 'cruel trilemma," coined by
Justice Goldberg, was used to describe the situation of a criminal
suspect forced into a position of self-accusation, perjury, or contempt.' when questioned by his accusers. Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor. 378 U.S. 52.55 (1964).

good and sufficient on its face
[elvidence which, if unexplained or uncontradicted. Is sufficient to sustain a judgment in
favor of the Issue which it supports, but which may be contradicted by other evidence" BL.cxs LAw DK*cn
1190 (6th ed.
1990)

137. See Jerry A. Lindheim, self.lnsurers and Rise Managers

142, See Laswell &Nilman, supra note 2.
143 See Kinnickv. Schierl, Inc. 197 Wis, 2d 855 (1995).
144. Lindheim. supra note 137.at445.
145 Kinnik. 197 Wis. 2d at 863, nliquoting D. Alan
Rudin. Strdegies LA
Utiguiu Multple PkixToTmc Tort Suits.in Emn.
LInG. 122. 137 (lanet S. Kole. et al eds.. 1991)).

Annual Survey, 27 To R& INS. LJ. 445.451 (1992).
138.

Laswell & Nijman, supra note 2.

139. See Nancy Campbell Brown, Predictingthe Future-Present
Mental Anguish for Fear of Developing Cancerin the Future as a Result of
Past Asbestos Exposure, 23 MEm. ST. U. L REv. 337. 367 (1993).
140. See Laswell & Nilman, supranote 2.

141. "Prima facie evidence" may be defined as "evidence

146
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or contributed to, plaintiffs' injuries."17 A consequential result of this purpose is to discourage the bringing of weak or questionable
claims, as well as those whose motivation may
be less a quest for justice and more a manifestation of greed."'
The first well-known example of such an
effort came in 1985, when a New Jersey court
entered what has come to be known as a "Lone
Pine Order."'49 This order marked the beginning
of the application of a particularized form of
CMO in toxic tort cases, one which functions in
toxic tort cases as "a supervisory pretrial order
that requires plaintiffs to show a prima facie
case before other pretrial activity begins."' "
In the Lone Pine case, the Superior Court
entered a case management order that
required the plaintiffs to medically document
their claimed exposure to toxic material from a
landfill."' When the plaintiffs failed to satisfy
this requirement, the court dismissed the case
with prejudice"' for their failure "to provide
sufficient information to establish the existence of a prima facie case.""'
The case management order, as a result,
evolved into a more powerful form. Rather
than merely requiring the litigants to meet the
objectives stated above,

4

1

it was used as a pro-

cedural sieve. If the court had not entered the
case management order that it did, the case
would almost certainly have continued, even
though the plaintiffs' failure to sufficiently
comply with the court's requirements clearly
demonstrated the insufficiency of their
147. Renaud v. Martin Marietta Corp.. 749 F Supp. 1545,
1551 (D. Colo. 1990).
148,

See Laswell & Nijman, supra note 2.

149. The name comes from the case Lore v. Lone Pine, No.
L33606-85, slip op. (N.J. Super. Ct., Nov. 18. 1986).

150. Laswell &Nilman, supra note 2.
151. See id.
152. A 'dismissal with prejudice" Is "an adjudication on
the merits, and final disposition, bamng the right to bring or
maintain an action on the same claim or cause. it is res ludicata
as to every matter litigated." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 469 (6th ed.

1990).
153.
154.
155.
156.

Laswell &Nilman, supra note 2.
See supra Section IIIlA
See Laswell & Nilman, supra note 2.
"Summary judgment" may be defined as a 'Iplroce-
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claim."' And while the summary judgment
motion is available, the procedural safeguards
associated with that device are significant, and
may result in inadequate screening of weak
toxic tort claims." Few would dispute the benefits garnered from excluding from the courts
those who are unable to demonstrate a prima
facie case, but who are more than willing to
subject wealthy defendants to years of protracted litigation."' Yet, unfortunately, appellate courts still occasionally reverse trial
courts for dismissals entered for plaintiffs' failure to comply with a Lone Pine Order."8
Doubtless, some of these reversals are merited, but they nevertheless serve to inhibit the
successful general application of strict case
management techniques. The resulting uncertainty could be avoided entirely if state legislatures and judicial councils were to clarify the
statutes and rules permitting the application
of CMOs.
Still, the Lone Pine case marked a new
beginning for case management orders. It signified a new and bold attempt by the courts to
contain a tide of possibly frivolous claims. The
notion that defendants in toxic tort actions
should not be forced to litigate baseless or
weak claims has taken hold. As indicated by
the widespread support that Lone Pine Orders
enjoy, most courts reject the common argument that such orders are unfair 1:o plaintiffs
because they withhold from plaintiffs the
opportunity to even make a case.""
Thus, not only have Lone Pine Orders
dural device available for prompt and expeditious disposition of
controversy without trial when there is no dispute as to either
material fact or inferences to be drawn from undisputed facts, or
if only question of law is involved." BLACK'S L.AwDicrioNARY 1435
(6th ed. 1990). See also FED. R. Civ. P. 56; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 437c
(West 1998). The relationship between the summary judgment
motion and the case management order In toxic :ort cases Is dlscussed nfra at III.E.3.

157. It should be noted that the exclusion of Insincere
plaintiffs works to the benefit of litigants with valid and Important environmental claims before the courts, as their general
standing increases substantially If the Lone Pine hurdle Is successfully met.
158. See, e.g., Abram v. Relchhold Chemicals, Inc, No, 9560784 (5th Cir.,
1996) (cited in51h Circuit Reinstates 8 of 15 Dismissed
Claims Against Chemical Company, 5 No. 9 MEALEY'f EMERGING Toxic
TORTS 16, August 9, 1996.)
159. See id.
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enjoyed widespread judicial approval, they
have, in a more practical sense, seen increasing
use." Case law provides many instances where
courts employ Lone Pine Orders or the functional equivalent thereof. In the Love Canal litigation, a court employed a Lone Pine Order,
determining that its utility in avoiding the
costs and delay of pretrial procedure and discovery made it indispensable."' In Robinson v.
Monsanto Co., the defendant argued that a
"CMO would promote efficiency, eliminate
baseless claims, force the plaintiffs to undergo
an examination by a toxicologist who could
testify to the chemical at issue, and provide the
circumstances of each exposure. "'62 Before the
court could rule on the CMO motion, the case
settled. Another case, In re Hanford Nuclear
Reservation Litigation, applied a toxic tort CMO in
a nuclear and hazardous waste contamination
case."63 In addition, one defendant in a toxic
tort case argued for a case management order
by stating that such orders are 'well recognized
by state and federal practice in 'toxic tort'
cases."'"
In Abarca v. Hon. Mike Westergren, a plaintiff
in a toxic tort case sought a writ of mandamus
from a trial court's Lone Pine Order."' The
plaintiffs argued that the court "denied plaintiffs reasonable opportunity to develop the
merits of their case and compromised their
ability to present viable claims at trial."'" The
defendants argued that they "should not be
required to spend enormous sums of money to
defend against claims of individuals who have
no reasonable basis in fact for their claims."167
The defendants further argued that "the case
management order is within the trial court's
160. See Laswell & Nijman, supra note 2.
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broad discretion to manage discovery and is
consistent with other Lone Pine-type orders. "'"
The Supreme Court of Texas denied the plaintiffs' request for a writ. "
In Schelske v. Creative Nail Design,'" the Montana Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of a
toxic tort suit filed by an ex-beautician who
claimed exposure to cosmetics had caused her
'digestive disorders.""' The Montana Supreme
Court held that "the plaintiff had not sufficiently complied with a case management order
that mandated that she plead each chemical
that allegedly caused harm and provide a
physician's opinion as to a causal link between
each exposure and injury."'n As a result, it
upheld the trial court's grant of summary judgment.'"
In Cottle v. Supenor Court, a California court
of appeal upheld a trial court's application of a
case management order, despite a forceful dissent that argued that the effects of such orders
were too similar to the summary judgment
order without any of the accompanying procedural safeguards." There, the court held that
.a court may order the exclusion of evidence if
the plaintiffs are unable to establish a prima
facie claim prior to the start of trial."'$
2. Advantages of the Lone Pine Order
While disadvantages no doubt exist, Lone
Pine Orders have essentially enjoyed great
approbation. They are viewed as -effective
toolls] for achieving efficiency and economy
for parties and the judiciary." alike.' They are
predictably popular amongst industry defense
counsel who seek to both deter groundless
cases and to preserve the economic resources
166, Teas High Court. supha note 165.

161. See In the Matterof Love Canal Actions, 547 N.YS. 2d
174 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1989).

167

Id

168

Id

162. Robinson v. Monsanto Co.. No. 842-00064 (Mo. Cir.
Ct., City of St. Louis, June 2,1989) (cited in Laswell & Nirnan.supra
note 2.).

169

Id

163. In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Utig.. 780 E Supp.
1551 (E.D. Wash. 1991).
164. Jackson v. Dow Chemical Co., No. 6206-92, (N.Y. Sup.
CL) (cited in Dow Seeks Case Management Orderin Pesticide Suit, I No.
19 ME EYs LIG. REP.: Toxic TORmS 16, Jan. 7. 1993).
165. Abarca v. Hon. Mike Westergren. No. 96-0911 (Tex.
Sup., Aug. 23, 1996) (cited in Texas Higi Court Denies Leav to Seek
Mandamus from Lone PineOrder 5 MFLE-Y's EM GINcGToxic Tomrs 20.
Nov. 26, 1996 lhereinafterTexas High CourtI.)

170 Sdcwske v Cretive Nail Desi, No. 96-153 (Mont. Sup.
CL. Jan. 2. 19971 (citid inTe s Hia Court, supra note 165j.
171 Steid
172
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of their clients.
Lone Pine Orders help to avoid redundancy, requiring plaintiffs to identify the nature
and substance of their claim, rather than permitting a plaintiff to file a complaint and then
sit back and wait. Plaintiffs frequently complain that such orders force them to "pre-try"
their claims." Indeed, one author states that
expecting plaintiffs to comply with a Lone Pine
Order can often be "unrealistic and almost
8 In defense
impossible."""
of the Lone Pine
Order, if the plaintiffs have a valid claim,
organizing and presenting the evidence the
court demands should not present too difficult
a task.' " This is especially true considering the
requirement that plaintiffs have evidence to
support their claims before filing suit in the
first place."" When one considers the immense
task and risk facing defendants in such suits,
establishing a minimum threshold for plaintiffs in the form of the Lone Pine Order seems
only fair.
Another argument in support of CMOs is
that the disclosure of evidence, which the
Lone Pine Order effectuates, necessarily
encourages settlement. 8 ' This argument is
supported by the fact that courts have broad
discretion to modify preexisting CMOs to
encourage settlement. 2 Conversely, forcing
plaintiffs to disclose evidence they do not possess because of claim invalidity will discourage the very bringing of false claims, an
estimable goal.
An argument against the Lone Pine Order
objects to the consequences of noncompliance. For example, in the actual Lone Pine case,
the plaintiffs' case was dismissed with prejudice. Thus, the argument goes that the doors
of the court are wrongly closed to plaintiffs,
who necessarily lose the opportunity to ever
bring that claim again, even though no finder
of fact made an adjudication on the merits.
One solution proposed in response to this
argument is to dismiss such claims without
177. See id.
178.

Lippes, supra note 40, at 520.

preludice, thereby enabling the plaintiff to
bring his claim again if it is indeed valid but
was merely hamstrung by some other factor.'
Defendants would likely respond that a dismissal with prejudice is entirely appropriate if
plaintiffs are unable to even make a prima
facie case of their injuries or exposure.
This note takes the position that the
advantages of Lone Pine Orders in toxic tort
cases far outweigh the disadvantages. True,
the consequences of noncompliance are
harsh, but harsh they must be if the role of the
courts is to be maintained as forums for legitimate conflict resolution. The filter that Lone
Pine Orders represent is specially designed to
screen from the court system those claims that
have no right to be there. Legitimate plaintiffs
have little to fear when a court imposes a CMO
in the form of a Lone Pine Orcer. Neither
should plaintiffs be surprised by tie fact that
not only are defendants widely expected to
request Lone Pine Orders, courts are predisposed to grant such requests.'" Establishing a
prima facie case is a simple procedure, hardly
one to which a plaintiff about to expose a
defendant to costly and time-consuming litigation should object. In the interests of justice, the imposition of the Lone Pine Order in
toxic tort cases is, therefore, imperative.
3. The Lone Pine Order: Summary
Judgment Incognito?
One author has stated two principle differences between summary judgment motions
and Lone Pine Orders in the following manner:
First, the showing required to satisfy a
Lone Pine Order may be less than the quantum of evidence required to create a fact question in response to a motion for summary
judgment. Second, a judge hearing a motion
for summary judgment may allow the plaintiffs
to proceed with discovery in order to obtain
evidence for use in opposing the motion.''
Thus, a CMO seems to arrive at the same
182. See Ramirez Pomales v. Becton Dickinson & Co, 839
F.2d i. 3 (Ist Cir. 1988).

179. See id.

183. See Laswell & Nilman, supra note 2.

180. See Lindheim, supra note 137, at 452.

184.

See Lindheim, supra note 137, at 453.

181. See id.

185.

Id.at 452.
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result as the summary judgment. This similarity
alone is not problematic. However, some have
lamented ' that this similarity is untenable given
the lack of "procedural safeguards" when a Lone
Pine Order is applied, compared to the safeguards that exist in summary judgment proceedings.'" For example, in ruling on a summary judgment motion, evidence of the party moving for
summary judgment is strictly construed while
that of the party opposing the summary judgment is liberally construed."'
In Cottle v. Supenor Court, where a dismissal
was upheld for failure to comply with a Lone Pine
type order, the dissent argued that the defendant
there was able to enjoy all the benefits of a summary judgment without having to satisfy any of
the statutorily mandated requirements.'" There,
the dissent pointed out that if "the procedural
guidelines for summary judgment had been followed, the defendants would have had to have
initiated the process and have supplied evidence
[thatl causation could not be proved.""* The dissent observed that instead of abiding by the
statutory requirements of summary judgment,
the trial court imposed a "bastardized" case management order "which had the purpose and effect
of summary judgment but avoided the very procedures and protections the Legislature deemed
essential." 9' The majority was unpersuaded by
the dissent's arguments, ruling that the trial court
.properly used the court's inherent powers to
manage the complex litigation case before her.""
Thus, one may conclude that a Lone Pine
Order or its equivalent produces a result very
similar to the result produced by the summary
judgment. Nevertheless, courts have been willing
to uphold their application. Cottle is a good
example of how courts seem to uphold the Lone
Pine Order as within the "inherent powers" of the
trial court, irrespective of its functional similarity
to a summary judgment. "I Plaintiffs should take
cautious note of this trend. Still, such orders
usually find application only in complex litiga186. See Cottle v. Supenor Court. 3 Cal. App. 4th 1367

(Iohnson. I.,dissenting).
187.

See. e.g.. CAL. Ov. PROC. CODE § 437c (West 1998).

188. See Varn Bros. Corp. v. Wine World. Inc. 35 Cal. App.
4th 880 (1995).
189. See 3 Cal. App. 4th 1389 (Johnson. I.. dissenting).

tion, such as the toxic tort. Therefore, it appears
unlikely that the Cottle dissents fear that a "bastardized" equivalent of summary judgment will
assert itself throughout civil litigation.
IV. Proposal
A. Summary of Benefits and Drawbacks
As the legal system wrestles with the difficult
issue of balancing efficiency with equity, the
importance of maintaining the accessibility of
case management orders while taking caution
not to trample on the rights of the litigants cannot be cast aside. Case management orders have
many desirable attributes and some less desirable attributes. They undoubtedly make complex
litigation more efficient. In doing so, it may be
argued that they serve to keep the judicial system
accessible. Truly, without case management techniques, the delay and cost that would result
could make the courts inaccessible to many parties. There can be no doubt that case management techniques generally, and case management orders specifically, are here to stay. In a few
years they have "evolved from an option to an
acknowledged judicial responsibility.""
Of course, in its zeal to eradicate unnecessary
delay and cost, a court employing a case management order must exercise caution and due
care. The purpose of keeping the courts efficient
is frustrated if the very parties for whom the
courts strive to maintain access turn away in frustration. But, with careful balancing, most judges
should be able to achieve the difficult equilibnum of efficiency and fairness.
B. The CMO: An Essential Tool for
Simplifying and Expediting Complex
Uitigation
The legislature and judiciary must make
every effort to complete the circle of case management evolution. To be sure, once initiated
within a case, the CMO must be quick to
190
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change, when necessary, and must be adaptable to varying situations. Yet, the case management order is a young creation, and the last
decade has signified its turbulent adolescence.
It has recently emerged as a widely practiced,
widely accepted and widely enjoyed procedural
tool. Still, uncertainties as to its nuances
remain, and they must be resolved. Complex
litigation generally, and toxic torts specifically,
are becoming more and more common. The
time for making the final clarifications is now.
Obviously, case management orders are not the
panacea of delay reduction. They do however
serve well in meeting that goal. While principles of justice must supersede any procedural
tool, the case management order still suffers
the indignities of young law, even though it is
widely perceived by those who employ it as a
sage of civil procedure.
V. Conclusion
After an extensive analysis, it is easy to
become so consumed with procedural details
that one fails to recall the greater purpose
behind the existence of our legal system. In
Estate of Meeker v. Kleinbauer,the court notes that
the judiciary exists "to serve the public and
that this cannot be done when judges are inundated with fast track statistics and cheerleader
attitudes about case disposition numbers
which never seem to take into account the

195.

13Cal.App.4that i06.

rights of the parties."'"
The court in Estate of Meeker is obviously cor-

rect when it states that the function of the judiciary and the legal system is to serve the public. This noble goal, however, cannot be met
when courts are "inundated" withi seemingly
endless and costly litigation. Perhaps those
advocating the case management order do fall
prey to a "cheerleader" attitude at times, but
this attitude stems not from any desired disregard of "the rights of the parties." Rather, it
comes from a celebration of the fact that the
courts now seem to be empoweied to run a
case efficiently, in a time when doing so is
paramount to the successful and equitable
administration of justice. No longer is the judicial system hopelessly encumbered with a
proverbial procedural albatross. The courts
now have greater power to administer lustice
with fairness and efficiency.
The introduction posed the fol Lowing question: "Must the twin commandments with
which the judiciary is charged be mutually
exclusive?" Happily, the case management
order demonstrates that the answer to this
question is plainly "no." Efficiency and fairness
may indeed coexist in the microcosm of the
courtroom, but only if judges are empowered
and wise enough to assure their equal presence,
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Believe one who knows: You will find something greater in woods
than books. Trees and stones will teach you that which you can
never learn from masters.
Bernard of Clairvaux, 1090 - 1153

